Skip to main content

Aburi Accord Agreement

By januar 22, 2022No Comments

Many scholars believe that the Aburi issue and its impact on the Nigerian civil war have their origins in the creation of the Nigerian state. That is, the debate on the implementation of the Aburi Agreement was the problem of how the origin of the Nigerian state was related to the question of the future association of constituent entities within the nation. According to Adebayo Oluoshi and Osita Agbu (1996), “the attempt by military officers to prevent the nation from experiencing a bloody conflict has only distorted the Aburi issue and further complicated it with the consequences of the civil war.” The Aburi Agreement, as it is known today, was a set of agreements that emerged in 1967 from a two-day meeting (January 4 and 5) attended by delegates from the Federal Government of Nigeria (Supreme Military Council) and the Eastern Region, led by its leader, Colonel Ojukwu. I wanted to inform the general public of the importance of researching the impact of the Aburi Agreement on the civil war and post-civil war in Nigeria. The research will open up other dimensions and perspectives for the analysis of the Aburi Agreement. In addition, the work will reveal the many problems arising from the partial implementation by the federal government or the intransigent attitude of Ojukwus Osten to adhere to the last letters of the agreement. Aburi was well organized with a real mandate to resolve what had been seen as tearing the country apart. It had delegates who were appropriately and appropriately representative of the country`s population and who were initially tasked with reaching an agreement until a lasting solution based on maintenance and respect for decisions was sought. Aburi`s document was drafted to avoid further internal conflicts and contained guidelines to bring the country to the forefront without bloodshed. Aburi`s document was not intended for Muhammad and his mutineers to wage a genocidal campaign against Biafra to keep one in Nigeria. Aburi`s diary was not intended to send innocent children, men and women from Biafra to their graves. The aburi newspaper was not a personal document of Gowon-Obafemi Awolowo-Anthony Enahoro, sealed to plunder and destroy the Igbo nation and the Republic of Biafra.

Aburi`s diary was not Western/vandal propaganda to wage a justified war in retaliation for a previous attack or invasion. The meeting in Aburi, Ghana, was decided on the basis of a consensus towards peace and not genocide, period! (2) The Accra Decision transfers executive power of the Federal Military Government from the head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief (in accordance with Decree No. 1) to the Supreme Military Council. This implies that the commander-in-chief would have no power to control or dismiss regional governors. 45. In this context and since there is obviously no hope of a change in the Lieutenant-Colonel`s attitude. Gowon, the military government of the East, believes that the time has come for him to definitively oppose a regime that cannot respect voluntary agreements. The military government of the East is irrevocably engaged in the task of alleviating the suffering of its fighting people and giving them the peace, order and good government that are its main needs. To this end, the government will soon publish its future policy on the implementation of the Aburi agreements. 39.

Finally, the draft decree restores paragraphs 70, 71 and 86 of the former Constitution, which have been repealed, without also restoring the guarantees provided for in that Constitution. With this action lt.-col. Gowon, contrary to the spirit and letter of the Aburi Accords, assumes the power to declare a state of emergency throughout Nigeria. In a speech on the NTA many years later, Gowon said, “If I had had the opportunity to do my show first, because it was the deal, if I had committed to what he said, then there would have been no problem” In exchange for territorial control and in agreement with Russia and Britain, Gowon and his vandals paid for the conquest of Biafra through barter. This agreement allowed Nigerians to commit genocide and full-fledged attack in a conflict that has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of infants and children to death, outnumbered tens of thousands of civilians and massacred in the most horrific way. The decision of the warring parties (Ojukwu headed the eastern government and Gowon headed the Nigerian government) to meet in Aburi, Ghana, brought glimmers of hope for the much-traded entity called Nigeria. For many scholars, this decision was the last chance to avoid war and develop a more stable and peaceful unity/achieve peace. Finding the answer required, in part, political dialogue to reach consensus on how best to ensure the best existence of ethnic bodies without unnecessary friction. In the context of the full implementation of the agreement, the Nigerian government has therefore resorted to the famous lines of John F. Kennedy: “Whoever makes impossible a peaceful solution to the conflict makes war inevitable.” (Afflerbach: 2007). The near-implementation of the Aburi Agreement, over time, has become the oft-cited example of civil war.

A little beyond this bogus conclusion, however, something else has shown that admitting the requirements of Decree No. 13 could also tear the country apart. This study highlights the misinterpretation of Aburi`s document; proposes important constitutional variables that urgently require national attention. In his book “Why We Struck,” Adewale Ademoyega noted that the “January Boys` Coup” was never an Igbo revolution, as claimed by the bloodthirsty vandals who had used the term “Igbo coup” to successfully use its cruel acts of unnatural taste: the pogrom. That the coup, according to Ben Gbulie, who testified before the Oputa Human Rights Commission, was organized and launched to install Avylovo for his “vision” and ambition as president. However, from this point of view, as well as that of Ademoyega and other sincere observers who know what the truth is, the January coup was not an Igbo coup; and this was not the beginning of Nigerian disunity. Nor did a great Nigeria emerge after the coup led by Chukwuma “Kaduna” Nzeogwu and the following six months that broke out the pogrom and civil war, leaving the children of Biafra with no choice but secession, and the events that gave rise to so many of today`s problems. An agreement like Aburi`s, which today is the often told story of an excellent document, had never been concluded before. Most people who read it sign that it should be carefully re-examined if the country really wants to care about its troubled past and the current pervasive tensions. “This mutual distrust did not end after the agreement. It seeped into our relationship and things started to deteriorate from that point on” “One of the reasons for the deal at the time was that there was already mutual distrust that continues to this day, which part of the country benefited from it or would have the best end to the deal,” he continued. .